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Abstract 
On 11 January 2016, 1128 academics in Turkey and abroad signed a petition calling on 
Turkish authorities to cease state violence in mainly Kurdish populated areas of the country, 
which had been under curfew and an extended state of emergency. The petition received an 
immediate reaction from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who accused the signatories of 
treason and terrorist propaganda. He subsequently demanded that public prosecuters launch 
an investigation. Criminalization of the petition has been exacerbated by disciplinary action 
by universities against many of the signatories. Many have suffered insults, arrest, detention 
or suspension as a result of the ensuing smear campaign. This massive crackdown on academic 
freedom has been masked by discourses of counter-terrorism, which have also been deployed 
to criminalize dissent more generally in Turkey as a part of a process of rapid ‘democratic 
retrenchment’ since 2013. This article is an attempt to put the criminalization of academics 
within the larger framework of human rights violations, increasing curtailments of academic 
freedom and rising authoritarianism in Turkey. It argues that the prosecution of the signatories 
of the petition is an extension of an established tradition of targeting academic freedom in 
times of political crisis in Turkey but is also a product of growing authoritarianism under the 
ruling party and President Erdoğan. It shows that counter-terrorism laws can be extended way 
beyond eliminating security threats by instrumentalizing them to suppress dissent in a declining 
democracy. 
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Introduction 
“It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and 
to expose lies. This, at least, may seem enough of a truism to 
pass over without comment.” 
Noam Chomsky, The Responsibility of Intellectuals, 1967 
 
On 11 January 2016, 1128 academics from 89 universities in Turkey and all around the world 
signed a petitioni calling on the Turkish authorities to cease state violence in the mainly Kurdish 
populated areas of the country which were under curfew and an extended state of emergency. 
The text criticized the Turkish state’s use of violence in the region and asked the government 
to prepare conditions for peace negotiations. Those negotiations broke down in June 2015 when 
both sides returned to violence after an almost six year, on and off ceasefire. The petition also 
criticized the Turkish state for contravening its own laws and violating international treaties. 
The conflict reached boiling point in the second half of 2015, when the Turkish military clashed 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK) and its urban youth 
wing, Tevgera Ciwanen Welatparêz Yên Şoreşger (The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth 
Movement – YDG-H). The petition was opened for signatures around this time, while non-
mainstream news agencies were reporting civilian casualties on a daily basis. Moreover,  as 
documented by a recent United Nations Report prepared by the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), serious human rights violations occurred 
during the curfews and entire residential areas were cut off from public reach and movement 
of lay people were restricted (OHCHR Report 2017, 2). The report estimates that the number 
of displaced people as a result of clashes and curfews were between 355,000 and half a million 
(ibid, 4). 
As Sözeri (2016) points out neither the claims about the Turkish state’s conduct nor the 
demands for restitution laid out in the petition were particularly novel. It nevertheless caused 
uproar in Turkey, so much so that it marked something of a turning point, presaging the official 
crackdown that would soon follow. Right after the petition was released, Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused the academics of treason at one of his public addresses and 
invited the judiciary to respond: “I call upon all our institutions: everyone who benefits from 
this state but is now an enemy of the state must be punished without further delay” (Shiermeier 
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2016). The judiciary, under the influence of the president, wasted no time in launching public 
prosecutions against many of the academics who had signed the peition. The signatories were 
accused, under Turkish counter-terrorism laws, of “terrorist organization propaganda”. 
Furthermore, the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu-YÖK) directed the 
universities to conduct disciplinary investigations which were followed in short order by police 
raids at academics’ homes and university offices resulting in dismissals, arrests, and detentions 
(Ugur 2016). The accusations did not let up, however, with signatories of the petition further 
condemned for insulting the Turkish state and engaging in terrorist acts (Altıparmak and 
Akdeniz 2017,13). As a reaction to this stigmatization and witch–hunt, around 1000 academics 
added their names to the petition in solidarity with the first group, increasing the total number 
of signatories to more than 2000.  
This was surely not the first attack on freedom of speech nor was it the first crackdown on 
academic independence in Turkey. In the past, limitations on the right to publish or teach on 
‘sensitive’ political issues have been widely reported and prison time has often served as 
punishment for academics challenging the state’s narrative on the Kurdish Questionii or the 
Armenian Genocide, which together constitute the ‘third rail’ in Turkish politics.iii However, 
the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition marked a new era. Whereas violations of academic freedom 
in the past had typically been sporadic and unsystematic, the government’s approach to using 
counter-terrorism discourse as a weapon against dissent promised suppression of academic 
freedom on an unprecedented scale. 
As Flader (2016) points out, the shocking wave of anticipatory obedience by the judiciary, 
higher education institutions and university rectors highlights how far authoritarianism in 
Turkey has reached over the last years. The failure of the peace process also paved the way 
towards less reconciliatory attitutes by the government against the opposition. Indeed as 
DeVotta (2015, 211) argues, civil wars and counter-terror practices might create an 
authoritarian shift if the conflict endures.  Although terrorism and counter-terrorism has been 
a fundamental part of Turkey’s vocabulary since the 1980s (Barrinha 2011), it has been taking 
new shapes and forms under the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi – AKP) and this incident coincided with a new era in Turkey where the definition of 
the concept of ‘terrorism’ has been stretched so far that it can be employed against anyone who 
fails to toe the party line.  
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This article contributes to general discussions of how counter-terrorism laws can be utilized by 
states to suppress ideas and groups that contest official narratives. It shows that those in power 
not only utilize laws but also engender a discourse around counter-terrorism that blurs the 
boundaries between actual terrorism and civil disobedience; and by doing that they arbitrarily 
limit freedom of speech. The narrative created around these laws can be instrimentalized to 
criminalize certain group and individuals. This article focuses on this very point and asks how 
so-called counter-terrorism laws and the discourse born out of them have enabled state 
authorities, the judiciary and the police to suppress dissent and freedom of speech in Turkey. 
It argues that the prosecution of the signatories of the petition is a continuation of long-term 
violations of academic freedom in Turkey as well as a consequence of the growing 
authoritarianism under the ruling party and President Erdoğan. The article will first detail the 
key background events that paved the way for the petition, with a specific focus on growing 
authoritarianism and the return to heigthened securitization prompted by the failure of the peace 
process. The following section will then focus on the situation of academic freedom in Turkey 
in general in order to demonstrate the violations of academic freedoms is not a recent 
phenomenon and then analyse the ‘Academics for Peace’ group, the petition and the 
developments in the aftermath of its press release. The article’s main focus is this specific 
petition, its background and its consequences. A final section will also be dedicated to the 
developments aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, which engendered 
a massive purge in Turkish academia which surely affected the signatories of the petition.  
 
Turkey’s Authoritarian Shift and the End of the Peace Process 
Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Turkey 
Turkey’s authoritarian shift forms part of a broader wave of ‘democratic retrenchment’ across 
the global since the 2000s. Weak democratic systems in the Balkans, Russia, Latin America 
and rising right-wing movements in most Western countries are visible general trends across 
the world (Levitsky and Way 2002). In this regard, since the end of the Cold War, scholars 
have tried to define these regimes by employing different concepts such as semi-democracy 
(Case 1993), virtual democracy (Norris & Jones 1998), illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997) and 
soft authoritarianism (Means 1996; Winckler 1984). Each of these concepts point to the decay 
of democracy in one way or another. Despite holding elections regularly, such regimes neglect 
the basic tenants that we have come to associate with contemporary liberal democracies. 
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Instead, elections even become instruments to legitimize increasing authoritarianism (Schedler 
2006, 6-19). In Turkey, the concentration of power in the hands of President Erdoğan as a 
‘dominant leader’ through the instrumentalization of state apparatuses and the ruling AKP’s 
hegemony over civil society and the media are the important pillars of Turkey’s new 
authoritarianism. The AKP’s hegemonic political project is increasingly being referred to as 
‘New Turkey’. 
The AKP, founded in 2001, came to power in 2002 and rose on the back of a highly promising 
reform agenda. It increased its popularity not just in Turkey but also abroad by framing its 
demands and goals in line with those the European Union made of Turkey in its membership 
bid. Their actions were praised and they were depicted as the fresh political elite who could put 
Turkey on the path to rapid democratization. The AKP then quickly emerged as Turkey’s 
dominant political party, winning landslide victories until the elections of June 2015. Despite 
a noticeable loss of support at the June 2015 poll, the party was able to reconsolidate its power 
following a snap election in November 2015. This election received much criticism from 
international and domestic observers who pointed to “irregularities in the campaign, including 
media bias and self-censorship, misuse of state resources to support Erdoğan’s election bid, 
lack of transparency in campaign finances, and voter fraud” (See Freedom House Turkey 
Country Report). 
Lately, the AKP’s rule has received much criticism from the opposition, civil society 
organizations and non-mainstream media in Turkey as well as the international community. 
The AKP and its influential former leader (and current Turkish president) Erdoğan have 
transformed Turkey into a de facto presidential system in which the president assumes more 
and more control over the executive, legislative and judicial branches, a move that is both 
perturbing and polarizing (Öztürk 2014). As Yeşilada (2016, 19) very well summarizes, the 
positive environment of the early 2000s when the AKP came to power and promised certain 
reforms, has been replaced by “a grim picture of illiberal political developments that are 
characterized by President Erdoğan’s power grabs, loss of judicial independence, and electoral 
manipulations to achieve the desired election outcome that favoured Erdoğan and the Justice 
and Development Party.”  The final objective appears to be a full ‘executive presidency’ in 
which all power is concentrated in the hands of the president. Authors such as Esen and 
Gümüşçü (2016) define the current situation as competitive authoritarianism by arguing that 
Turkey no longer satisfies even the minimal requirements of democracy. Akkoyunlu and 
Öktem (2016) also define Turkey as country where there is personalization of executive power, 
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weakening of democratic checks and balances, less free and fair electoral competition, 
imposition of stricter constraints on freedom of expression and civil liberties. They also 
underline that there is growing use of state’s coercive capacity to suppress various forms of 
violent and non-violent dissent.  
The AKP’s leaders manipulated Turkey’s weak post-2008 democratic system to advance an 
agenda that was in fact anti-democratic and authoritarian. During the last decade, dozens of 
activists, academics, politicians, journalists, and others have been detained simply for 
disagreeing with government policies, or for opposing Erdoğan’s discourses on political, 
economic, and social matters. In this regard, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2015 
Democracy Index defined Turkey as a hybrid regime that combines democratic procedures and 
autocratic practices. In a similar fashion, the 2015 report of Freedom House ascertained that 
media freedom in Turkey deteriorated at an alarming rate in this year. The World Justice 
Project’s 2016 Rule of Law Index ranks Turkey 99th out of 113 countries, which implies the 
absence of a significant judicial check on government and the presence of governmental 
interference in judicial processes (Rule of Law Index). The AKP government utilized its control 
of the judiciary to punish critical reporting and political opposition via the country’s famous 
anti-terror law (Patton 2007, 339-34), which has been both disproportionate and ill-tailored 
(Dearden 2016). The term is stretched such that its reference point is no longer the law, the 
Turkish constitution, or international norms and regulations. More than 2000 legal cases were 
opened with the allegations of “insulting the President” against people who criticized Erdoğan 
on social media and elsewhere. Turkey has become an example of how democratically-elected 
governments take undemocratic paths to cling to power and how counter-terrorism policies go 
hand in hand with authoritarianism on the path to one-man rule. The AKP and its leader 
Erdoğan emerged as the two key elements in this context (Keyman and Gümüşcü 2014). 
It is true that the AKP retains an autonomous party structure on paper. At the same time, it 
would be fair to say that Erdoğan and the party have become almost synonymous (Özbudun 
2014, 157). As mentioned, during Erdoğan’s term as president, he has openly declared his 
ambition to switch the political system from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential one. 
In Giorgio Agamben’s terminology, Erdoğan could be thought of as having instrumentalized 
‘exceptional circumstances’ to present himself in the public domain as an ‘exceptional leader’ 
– the only one who can steer Turkey past the rocky shoals on its present course (Agamben 
2005, 40). Of course, many dimensions of the economic and foreign policy crises that Turkey 
faces at present are in fact, at least in part, of Erdoğan’s own making, which makes his claims 
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to ‘exceptional’ leadership that much more ironic.  After almost fifteen years in power, Erdoğan 
has established a network of control across the entire Turkish state of which he is the ‘central 
node’. Moreover, the continuation of the civil war in the southeast of the country combined 
with the nationalistic sentiments of the majority of the Turkish population and the lack of 
resistance from either the parliament or the judiciary have produced a toxic political 
environment in which extreme sentiments find fertile soil. In this regard, counter-terrorism 
discourse also emerges as a useful tool to suppress all dissent.  
Turkey under Erdoğan presidency is by no means the only example of political 
instrumentalization of crisis in the pursuit of power. DeVotta (2015, 210-11) notes, for 
example, how Sri Lanka’s illiberal democratic regime transitioned to a soft-authoritarian one 
during the Sri Lankan civil war and the way in which counter-terrorism discourse against the 
Tamil Tigers was formative in that process. By suggesting that exceptionalism fosters 
democratic retrenchment, he also claims that “civil wars justify counter-terror practices, and 
the longer the conflict the more draconian these practices can become” (DeVotta 2015, 210-
11). The decades-long war between the PKK and the Turkish state has created an atmosphere 
of insecurity, polarization and mistrust in Turkey. Erdoğan’s and the ruling party’s politics 
works by activating the fears of the population and thus relies heavily on societal consensus 
regarding the ‘threat’ emerging from violent Kurdish separatism. As Altıparmak and Akdeniz 
(2017, 104) note, since the collapse of the peace process, counter-terrorism has become the 
token excuse to limit freedom of speech and assembly. The concept of “terror” is so vague that 
academics, members of parliament, actors, artists, journalists and others can easly be targeted 
with accusations of making “terrorist propaganda”. The authors claim that Turkey, still, does 
not have the legal infrastructure that could be used to accommodate these definitions used by 
the state authorities that strongly violates human rights. Due to the many cases that have been 
sent to the European Court of Human Rights, Turkey had to make a lot of modifications in its 
laws which basically limited the ground to arbitrarily use these laws. However, in the time of 
crises, the state does not shy away from bending the law accordingly.iv   
In this regard, the case of ‘Academics for Peace’ may have disturbed the governing party’s 
agenda by openly criticizing its actions in national and international platforms. The punishment 
for this ‘impudence’, then, was justified within the framework of counter-terrorism and Turkish 
nationalism.  
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The End of the Peace process 
The roots of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict can be traced back well before to the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. As a result of nation-
building efforts in the early republican era, a number of harsh measures were implemented to 
suppress any kind of dissent against the newly emerging and fragile authority of the state, with 
the aim of creating a unified nation under one flag from an ethnically, religiously and 
linguistically divided country. Therefore, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict can be understood as a 
constant resistance against the Turkish state’s assimilation policies. These policies have 
resulted in the systematic suppression of Kurdish identity, and subsequently a demand for the 
recognition and restitution of this group’s basic political, cultural and linguistic rights.  
 
Over the last few decades the conflict turned violent, making it the country’s primary political 
challenge, not to mention a high priority security problem that threatens the country’s territorial 
integrity. There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish armed 
group PKK since the early 1980s. For a long time, the Turkish state had a ‘no negotiation with 
terrorists’ approach and opted for a military solution. Especially in the 1990s, South-East 
Turkey was ruled under constant state of emergencies where extra-judicial killings, 
dissapearences and deportations became the norm. Kurdish politicians, journalists, activists 
and other human rights activists were criminalized throughout this whole period and often tried 
for “supporting terrorist propaganda”. Overall, nearly 50,000 people were killed in this armed 
conflict and it is estimated that up to two million Kurds were displaced, lost their properties 
and suffered from the consequences of this low-intensity civil war (See Uluğ and Cohrs 2017, 
4).  
 
The AKP came to power in 2002 and its rise to power was a turning point in Turkey for many 
reasons. It started implementing a conservative agenda and, at the same time, ‘taboo’ topics 
such as Kurdish identity and peace negotiations were opened to discussion. The AKP gradually 
began implementing reforms to accommodate Kurdish identity in order to align itself with the 
membership ideals of the European Union. After 2009, the AKP first started with a reform 
process which was called the “Kurdish Initiative”. A state TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish 
was opened and several departments at universities started offering curriculum in Kurdish. The 
AKP also ended the state of emergency as a gesture of good will to show that they were 
determined to find a peaceful solution to this problem. In the meantime, the AKP decided to 
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implement a policy of negotiation with the PKK. Between September 2008 and 2011, there 
had been several meetings in Oslo, between high-level representatives from the National 
Intelligence Agency (MIT) and top PKK leaders witin the company of international mediators. 
These talks collapsed in 2011 however talks about talks continued until June 2015 with several 
ceasefires, visits to the imprisoned leader of the PKK by HDP (People’s Democratic Party) 
representatives and various parliamentary commissions which prepared reports for potential 
roadmaps.  
 
The peace process officially ended due to the lack of commitment from both sides on certain 
issues. For instance, the PKK has never completely withdrawn from Turkey as any lasting 
peace will require it to do, while the government has failed to implement the reforms that were 
demanded by the Kurdish side and were promised by the government. However, the impact of 
the June 2015 elections was the last nail in the coffin of the peace process.  The AKP, in losing 
the absolute majority of votes in that poll, sought to burnish its nationalist credentials to appeal 
to that segment of Turkey’s electorate that is most supsceptible to nationalistic appeals in 
advance of rescheduled elections in November 2015. As the violence resumed, attacks on both 
sides were reported and several high-profile bombings in Ankara and Istanbul took place. A 
state of emergency was declared in certain parts of Turkey and this has led to gross human 
rights violations as there have been extensive civilian casualties.   
Turkish security forces used heavy artillery, tanks and other armed vehicles while the PKK’s 
youth wing, YDG-H, dug trenches (sometimes filled with explosives) and planted barricades 
in order to limit access by the Turkish security forces to their neighbourhoods (Human Rights 
Watch 2015). During what the state authorities called ‘security operations’, many Kurdish 
civilians – including women, children and elderly – were killed. Human Rights Watch reports 
that more than 100 civilian deaths were recorded while many people suffered multiple injuries. 
In December, they also reported that these numbers were likely to increase due to the heavy 
clashes (Human Rights Watch 2015). The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey published a 
press release on 9 January 2016 that reported that 58 round-the-clock, open-ended curfews in 
around 20 districts and 7 cities (covering more than 1 million residents) in southeastern Turkey 
had been officially confirmed.  The Foundation’s statement indicates that during these curfews, 
basic human rights have been violated and around 150 civilians including women, children and 
elderly were killed. OHCHR report revealed that 2000 people were killed in the context of 
security operations between July 2015 and December 2016. As the report suggests, this number 
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would include “close to 800 members of the security forces, approximately 1200 local 
residents, of which an unspecified number may have been involved in violent or non-violent 
actions against the state” (OHCHR Report 2017,2). The report also stated that they managed 
to document “numerous cases of excessive use of force, killings, enforced dissapearences, 
torture, destruction of housing and cultural heritage, incitement to hatred, prevention of access 
to emergency medical care, food, water and livelihoods, violence against women, and severe 
curtailment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression as well as political participation” 
(ibid). The report suggests that “it appears that the domestic protection of human rights in 
South-East Turkey has effectively been non-functioning since at least July 2015, as 
demonstrated by the reported lack of a single investigation into the alleged unlawful killings 
of hundreds of people over a period of 13 months between the late July 2015 and the end of 
August of 2016” (OHCHR Report 2017,3). 
 
 ‘We won’t be a party to this crime!’ 
The Role of Public Intellectuals in Tumultuous Times 
What happened to the signatories of the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition makes us question the 
role of public intellectuals in dark times. The petition was criticized by fellow academics for 
many reasons, including for its tone, its content, its wording and its supposed bias. Some 
academics also claimed that scholars should stay neutral in these cases. The question of 
‘neutrality’ in times of conflict raises serious questions, however. Is a deliberate nonchalance 
in the face of massive human rights violations the same thing as staying ‘neutral’? Or, as 
Chomsky (1967) pointed out, is it the public intellectual’s duty to expose deceit and falsehood? 
Is it the duty of academics to speak truth to power?  
Petitions, anti-war campaigns, open letters, protests and boycotts are among many other 
strategies that have been used by academics to criticize certain governments or states 
throughout history. For example, the Manifesto of the 121 – an open letter penned by 121 
intellectuals, academics, reporters and journalists (including Jean-Paul Sartre) in France, and 
published by the magazine Vérité-Liberté in 1960 – stands out for its historical importance. 
Sartre did not organize the petition, but his participation was crucial (Leak 2006). The 
Manifesto called on the French state and the French people to acknowledge that conflict was a 
legitimate struggle for independence by the Algerian people, and denounced the use of torture 
by the French military. It also called on the authorities to respect French conscientious 
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objectors to the conflict. After the petition, no retribution was brought on Sartre, however other 
signatories of the Manifesto were dismissed from their posts (Leak 2006, Schalk 1991).  
Moreover, as Schalk (1991, 106) points out:  
Le Monde printed in its entirety a countermanifesto of October 1960 that 
condemned the work of ‘the professors of treason,’ accused of being a  
‘fifth column’ that draws its inspiration from ‘foreign propaganda.’ This 
manifesto was signed by nearly three hundred intellectual supporters of 
Algerie francaise, including seven members of the French Academy. But 
at that time readers could only speculate as to the exact nature of ‘treason’ 
supposedly perpetrated by these ‘professors.’ 
Surely it is possible to find other examples of these sorts of open letter/manifestos/petitions. 
Chomsky’s ‘political interventions’ have become the stuff of legend (Giroux 2016, 179). He 
was at the forefront of opposition against the Vietnam War, writing numerous articles on the 
issue. The 1965 ‘teach-in’ on the Vietnam War at the University of Michigan was also a 
remarkable step towards showing dissent against war mongering at higher education 
institutions.v Also, in early 1967, more than five thousand US scientists signed a petition asking 
the President to stop using certain types of weapons which were said to be inhumane (Krane 
2011, 4).  
Academics have long intervened in peace processes as well. For example, during the apartheid 
period in South Africa, a group of Stellenbosch University academics formed a group called 
the ‘Stellenbosch ’85 Discussion Group’, chaired by Professor Sampie Terreblanche. This was 
a group apart from the more classic leftist ‘anti-status quo’ group of academics, who often 
found themselves threatened and excluded from university campuses if they were against the 
apartheid regime and who often risked being sacked by the university administration or being 
detained by the police. The academics within the Stellenbosch group, in contrast, held 
‘priviledged’ positions in South African society. Yet they decided to criticize the apartheid 
regime inspite of the risks to their personal reputation and position. Some members of this 
group, such as Prof. Willie Breytanbach and Prof. Willie Esterhuyse, also participated in 
clandestine meetings with ANC representatives in the United Kingdom, which gradually paved 
the way for a peaceful reconciliation period in South Africa.vi Around two dozen intellectuals 
who were mostly based at Stellenbosch University, even had a meeting with then-President P. 
W. Botha. The discussion group showed that the perceptions of the Afrikaner elite were 
 12 
changing and was also a clear signal to the political elite that they were losing the support of 
the intellectuals (See Horowitz 1991 :79).  
More recently, a group of Israeli academics published a petition in 2014 criticizing Israeli state 
policies in Gaza. The signatories declared their desire that it “be known that they utterly deplore 
the aggressive military strategy being deployed by the Israeli government.” They argued that 
state violence is creating more divisions between the two communities and the bloodshed is 
preventing a peaceful solution which is the only alternative to end this conflict. Similar to the 
‘Academics for Peace’ petition in Turkey, they stated that “Israel must agree to an immediate 
cease-fire, and start negotiating in good faith for the end of the occupation and settlements, 
through a just peace agreement” (Statement by Israeli academics July 2014).  
Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals also have written similar petitions, manifestos and open 
letters. The Aydinlar Dilekcesi manifesto stands out in this regard. After the 12 September 1980 
coup, Turkey established a comprehensive martial law regime under the management of the 
country’s military-dominated National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi-MGK) and 
high numbers of detentions, political restrictions, and torture were reported across the country. 
Furthermore, media and intellectual freedoms were radically restricted during the period of 
military rule. In response, in May 1984 a group or intellectuals presented a petition criticizing 
this state of affairs to both the presidency and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM). Popularly known throughout the country as the ‘Intellectuals’ 
Petition’, it was in fact originally titled ‘Observations and Requests about the State of 
Democracy in Turkey’ (Türkiye’de Demokratik Düzene İlişkin Gözlem ve İstemler). It was 
signed by 1383 scholars, authors, actors, poets and artists. The petition stated the importance 
of freedom of thought and speech for Turkey’s democratic future. It highlighted the issue of 
torture in prison – describing this as a crime against humanity – and demanded a general 
amnesty to convicted of ‘thought crimes’. The reaction of the Turkish state bears repeating and 
has echoes of today’s situation. The Martial Law Command immediately prohibited further 
publication of the petition and opened a case against 56 of the most prominent of the 
signatories, including the author Aziz Nesin, the journalist Uğur Mumcu, the scholar Yalçın 
Küçük and Hikmet Çetin, a former politician. The first trial was held in August 1984 and all 
the suspects were acquitted in February 1987 (See Index on Censorship, 1984).  
Another controversial political campaign has been the ‘Özür Diliyorum’ (I Apologize) 
campaign, launched as an online petition in 2008. The campaign’s principal objective is to 
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prompt a public discussion about the 1915 Armenian Genocide – as mentioned, a highly 
politically sensitive issue in Turkey – by calling for a collective national apology for the events 
and expressing regret and sorrow for the loss felt by the victims and the injustice caused. Four 
prominent public intellectuals – Ahmet İnsel, Baskın Oran, Cengiz Aktar and Ali Bayramoğlu 
– authored the campaign declaration, which read: “My conscience does not accept the 
insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians 
were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings 
and pain of my Armenian brothers. I apologize to them.” After a short period, the petition 
garnered more than 30,000 signatories online, prompting reactions from the key political 
players – including then-prime minister Erdoğan, who was critical – and widespread public 
discussion and debate. Most of the signatories received death threats. Furthermore, the Office 
of the Public Prosecutor launched an investigation into the crime of ‘public humiliation of the 
Turkish nation’ regarding the campaign, but it did not turn it into an official case. 
The ‘Academics for Peace’ petition is no different to the examples provided above in terms of 
scope and intentions. However, it has arguably been the most impactful of all, although not as 
intended. Rather than drawing attention to the plight of civilian Kurds in southeastern Turkey, 
it has provoked a vicious reaction from the state and some segments of civil society. Moreover, 
state authorities crackdown has been facilitated by the petition itself, which provides a 
wholesale list of academics in numerous institutions in Turkey who dissapprove of the 
government’s approach to the Kurdish Question after the failure of the peace process. The 
tremendous courage of these scholars has been met, therefore, with retribution and malicious 
intent.  
 
Academic Freedom in Turkey 
Academic freedom is under threat all around the world, something scholars have been bringing 
to the attention of the academe and the wider public for more than a decade. Nehring and 
Kerrigan (2016) observe that this phenomenon is not limited to authoritarian countries; even 
liberal democracies are becoming less and less secure for academic freedom and freedom of 
speech. Henry A. Giroux’s (2016) criticism towards neo-liberalism and its impact on higher 
education institutions is remarkable. His examination of current academic practices indicates, 
in his view, the emergence of new age of authoritarianism. Even in so-called liberal societies 
critical thinking is not welcome at institutions of higher education where academic indifference 
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towards injustice and violence is becoming the norm. Critical thinking, he contends, is 
increasingly ‘criminalized’ across the globe: “Academics who function as critical public 
intellectuals have always posed a threat to authoritarian states and corporate entitites, just as 
the institutions in which they worked were viewed as a threat to authoritarian powers” (Giroux 
2016, 118). Turkey is no exception here, and even when the trends of democratization were 
moving in a positive direction, academics faced intense pressure to eschew public 
dissemination of “dangerous thinking” (Giroux 2016). It is worth, therefore, detailing in brief 
the story of academic freedom in Turkey in general, in order to contextualize recent events 
surrounding the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition.  
As mentioned, heavy limits on academic independence have been a feature of the Turkish 
political scene long before the rise of the AKP. University campuses were the site of the most 
contentious and often violent ideological confrontations between leftists and rightists during 
the period of ‘radicalization’ of Turkish politics in the late 1960s and 1970s. In response, the 
military regime established after the 12 September 1980 coup established a state authority –
YÖK to ‘monitor’ universities and ensure institutionalized state control over the higher 
education institutions (Gocek 2016). While YÖK did not function as an apparatus of direct 
‘thought control’ it nevertheless had something of a ‘chilling effect’ on academic conduct and 
publication. Moreover, in the wake of Turkey’s authoritarian turn, the existence of YÖK has 
provided the AKP with a ready-made state apparatus capable of clamping down hard on 
academic freedom. As Gocek (2016) states: “Since educational institutions are among the most 
significant places for research, their control becomes crucial in autocratic states. Rulers want 
to closely monitor access to knowledge and therefore to power.” Indeed, the space in which 
academics can conduct research and contribute to political discussions in Turkey has been 
radically constricted. The ‘Academics for Peace’ petition was simply the proverbial straw that 
broke the camel’s back in relation to academic freedom and the Kurdish Question.   
The deteriorating situation of Turkish academic freedom after 2010 has not gone unheeded. 
The International Working Group on Academic Liberty and Freedom of Research in Turkey 
(Groupe international de travail – GIT: “Liberté de recherche et d’enseignement en Turquie”) 
was founded in 2011 in the wake of the arrest of Prof. Busra Ersanli on charges of ‘terrorist 
propaganda’. This initiative of Turkish-born scholars (often working abroad) and international 
partners was established to monitor and expose further attacks on academics in Turkey. By 
early 2012, the initiative had established chapters in Germany, Switzerland, France and North 
America. The group called for solidarity with Turkish academic colleagues, a petition signed 
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by hundreds of academics (GIT Turkiye, Akademik Ozgurlukler Icin Birlesme Cagrisi). GIT 
also launched a series of reports on violations of academic freedom in Turkey, the first of which 
was published in 2012 (GIT, Akademide Hak Ihlalleri). 
The work of GIT indicates that the solidarity shown towards the ‘Academics for Peace’ drew 
on a base already established with networks such as the Academics Solidarity Platform and the 
Foundation University Workers’ Solidarity Network (GIT Report 2016:2). The report states 
that:  
In the absence of academic freedom, one cannot speak of the autonomy of 
universities as institutions of higher education. Institutional autonomy alone 
is not sufficient to safeguard free thought and free research. A university may 
thrive, in a universal sense, only in the presence of both scientific and 
institutional autonomy (GIT Report 2016:7). 
The report places contemporary events in historical context by detailing the general 
degredation of academic freedom in Turkey, especially in moments of historical political crisis 
(GIT Report 2016: 9). It further notes that:  
After the year 2000, the ruling political powers established their own 
administrations at universities, step by step, and at every level. They never 
refrained from exerting pressure and applying censorship with regard to 
‘sensitive topics’ which have existed since the founding of the republic. 
Moreover, they widened the scope of repression at universities by means of 
introducing ‘brand new sensitive issues’ (GIT Report 2016: 9). 
Already in 2012, the GIT’s ‘Call to Unite for Academic Freedoms’ stated that academic 
research was being hindered by direct and indirect obstacles and that those academics lecturing 
on subjects that are considered taboo in Turkey faced particular difficulties. Underlining the 
urgent need for safeguarding freedom of expression and research, the call announced that the 
GIT Turkey will fight against oppression on academia. The GIT Report (2016) reveals that the 
sensitive topics which the academics are not allowed to touch upon in their academic work 
changes from one period to another not only depending on who the ruling party is but also on 
the changing dynamics of politics in Turkey. Many violation cases from all over Turkey are 
mentioned in GIT Reports which demonstrate that counter-terrorism narratives have been used 
to criminalize academics and delegitimize their academic work way before the petition was 
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publicly announced in January 2016.  For instance, a PhD thesis on the Kurdish issue and the 
Kurdish language was derecognized by Marmara University in Istanbul with the university 
stating that the PhD thesis has been contradicting with the Turkish Constitution’s articles that 
cannot be amended (Abbott 2012). The PhD candidate then defended her thesis in Lund 
University in Sweden. Another academic has won a large research grant to work on the Kurdish 
Question and civil society but his university did not let him pass the ethics committee because 
they found his topic controversial. Another academic asked an exam question to his students 
about the PKK leader Öcalan and his views and this was considered to be ‘terrorist 
propaganda.’ An investigation has been launched against him (GIT, Akademide Hak Ihlalleri 
Dosyasi). These types of violations of academic freedoms also continued after the petition. One 
professor at Akdeniz University resigned in April 2016 because her student’s thesis subject on 
the role of women in peacebuilding was deemed ‘dangerous’ by the university (Diken 29 April, 
2016). These incidents show that the failure of the peace process has also paved the way for 
the criminalization of concepts such as peace, peacebuilding or negotiations.  
 
The ‘Academics for Peace’ Petition Uproar: Criminalization, Targeting and Investigations 
into ‘Terrorist Propaganda’ 
The ‘Academics for Peace’ group differed somewhat from previous civil society initiatives 
such as the GIT. Although there is an overlap among the members of these initiatives, the 
‘Academics for Peace’ group’s principal concern was not academic freedom per se, but rather 
the question of justice for the Kurds. The group came together in 2012 just before the so-called 
peace process has started between the PKK and the Turkish state. They were a loose network 
rather than a registered NGO and lacked any distinct hierarchy or organization. The members 
of this initiative wanted to emphasize that there is very little known about the dynamics of the 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict in Turkey and they wanted to prepare a road map for enhancing peace 
and reconciliation at the societal level. During the peace process, they also voluntarily 
contributed to the production of knowledge on these issues.vii 
Erdoğan’s strong reaction to the petition alarmed YÖK and prosecutors immediately. In his 
talk, he stated that: “Despite all of these facts, this crowd, who calls themselves academics, 
accuses the state through a statement. Not only this, they also invite foreigners to monitor 
developments. This is the mentality of colonialism” (Hurriyet Daily News 12 January 2016). 
In an echo of reactions to the 1960 Manifesto of the 121 in France, the president labelled the 
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signatories “ignorant” and “so-called intellectuals” and accused them of being a “fifth column” 
and of disseminating a “colonizers’ mentality”. “Hey, you so-called intellectuals! You are not 
enlightened persons, you are dark. You are nothing like intellectuals. You are ignorant and 
dark, not even knowing about the east or the southeast. We know these places just like we know 
our home addresses,” he said, reiterating his position that Turkey’s problem is “not a Kurdish 
one, but one of terror.”  YÖK’s official response to the petition announced that: “The 
declaration issued by a group of academics that describes our state’s ongoing struggle against 
terror in the southeast as ‘massacre and slaughter’ has put our entire academic world under 
suspicion”. It followed this by stating: “This declaration cannot be associated with academic 
freedom. Providing the security of citizens is the primary responsibility of the state” (Hurriyet 
Daily News 12 January 2016). 
Immediately following the YÖK statement, 30 academics were detained. Their houses were 
raided by anti-terror squads within the police department. Their belongings, including books, 
computers, mobile phones and other research materials were confiscated. Apart from the 
criminal investigations, universities were also forced to open disciplinary inquiries into the 
signatories. In January and February, around 100 academics learned that they were being 
investigated by their institutions. During the investigations, many academics were questioned 
for their political views and a majority of the universities who opened probes did not treat this 
as a matter of freedom of speech or academic freedom (Human Rights Watch 16 March 2016).  
What was crucial about this ordeal was also the targeting and stigmatizing of academics as a 
collective. Erdogan’s reaction echoed in the mainstream media who duly published reports and 
op-eds criminalizing the academics and what they stand for. News channels kept talking about 
the petition for a long time, and broadcasts showed names, affiliations and photos of the 
signatories; some news programs even reviewed academics’ social media on live TV 
highlighting, for example, tweets that might be deemed anti-government or critical of President 
Erdoğan. A newspaper gave a full page with these academics’ names and affiliations. They had 
full disclosure, making them vulnerable. The propaganda surely had an impact on the public 
and how they perceived this petition. Some academics reported that they received threats from 
students, neighbours and even random strangers. Their office doors at universities were marked 
with red signs which stated ‘terrorist academics’ were not welcome at the universities. Many 
received emails or social media mentions and messages full of death threats and swear words. 
Some had to empty their offices at the university, leave their homes or even cities in in order 
to protect themselves (Sozeri 2016). For instance, in Eskişehir, a mannequin was hanged over 
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a highway with a banner stating “Death penalty to the PKK Academics” (Haberler 24 April 
2016). A cyber lynching was also put into force against the academics in social media outlets. 
While these were happening, the prosecutors were demanding information from signatories 
about the identity of the ‘mastermind’ of the petition (Flader 2016). The signatories were told 
during the interrogations that they are accused of taking orders from Bese Hozat, a PKK 
commander. Their argument was that the terminology used in the petition mirrored the 
‘terrorist organization’s vocabulary’. 
Moreover, a mafia leader who is known as a full-throated supporter of the AKP regime made 
a declaration on his blog page titled “The So-Called Intellectuals, The Bell Will Toll for You 
First.” In this post, he issued a horrific threat: “We will spill your blood in streams and we will 
shower in your blood” (Hurriyet Daily News 14 January 2016). Various politicians from the 
AKP also stated that the declaration itself has been drafted by the PKK and the academics have 
been taking orders from the PKK leadership. Their main criticism was that the petition has not 
criticized the PKK but solely directed its demands to the Turkish government. Indeed, many 
columnists picked up on this issue and claimed that the petition lacked academic rigour because 
it was ‘biased’ and it was only directed to the Trukish government without any criticism 
towards the PKK. The president and his supporters also claimed that the academics used 
‘terrorist jargon’ similar to the discourses of the PKK.  
In an attempt to delegitimize the petition even further, a counter-petition was prepared by pro-
government academics calling themselves ‘Academics for Turkey’. Their petition refused to 
criticize military action in southeast Turkey and instead declared full support for state policy 
against the PKK (See Sozeri 2016). Various universities put both direct and indirect pressure 
on their staff to sign the petition, and many did so simply in order not to be stigmatized in their 
respective institutions.  
Moreover, during the investigations many academics were subjected to bullying and mobbing. 
Some were forced to withdraw their signatures in order to prevent further criminalizaiton and 
investigations. In other cases, signatory academics withdrew their signatures voluntarily in 
order to detach themselves from these discussions. Some have done so legally with a press 
release while others preferred to stay anonymous. Human Rights Watch interviewed signatory 
academics during investigations and revealed the injustices they were facing. For instance, an 
assistant professor of sociology was suspended from Düzce University a day after Erdoğan’s 
first speech. She learnt about her suspension from the university website without an official 
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notice. Moreover, police raided her home and office and took her computer and other 
belongings. She testified before the Düzce public prosecutor and a court imposed a travel ban, 
preventing her from going abroad and to continue her academic work. Another academic from 
Van Yüzüncü Yıl University was taken into custody and spent a night in jail. Although he has 
German citizenship, he was also subject to a court-ordered travel ban. The university also 
informed him that his contract would not be renewed. Other academics from the same 
institution were also given court-ordered travel bans while criminal investigations were 
ongoing (Human Rights Watch Report, 2016). Fifteen scholars from Kocaeli University and 
three from Uludağ University have been detained and their houses raided by the police. These 
examples were multiplied as the investigations continued.  
Critics of the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition made two points. The first set of criticisms argued 
that the tone was unprofessional and harsh and that the petition only addressed criticisms 
towards the Turkish state while pointedly avoiding discussion of PKK activity and violations 
of rights. The second set emphasized the choice of wording. Use of the word ‘massacre’ – in 
the context of the apparent ‘deliberate and planned massacre’ by the Turkish state – was argued 
to be disproportionate. Many columnists and journalists joined the ‘Academics for Peace’ in 
making these criticisms. However, the petition still received tremendous support locally and 
internationally. viii For instance, the ‘Academics for Peace’ initiative also received several 
prizes, including the Palm Prize for free speech, the Aachen Prize, The Middle East 
Association’s Academic Freedom Award.  
 
The Pending Trial and Precariousness: Resisting Arrests, Deportation and Defamation 
Counter-terrorism emergency measures have already become a part of the daily routine in 
Turkey (Barrinha 2011). Flader (2016) takes the Turkish state’s reactions to the petition one 
step further, however, describing them as an example of Gleichschaltung, the process – 
originally developed by the Nazis – of eliminating all opposition within the political, economic, 
and cultural institutions of the state and establishing control over all aspects of society. In an 
interview, signatory academic Dr. Murat Ozbank also underlined the similarities between the 
current purge in Turkey and the Gleichschaltung in Nazi Germany by focusing on the 
totalitarian direction that Turkey is taking by suppressing the opposition both in political circles 
and civil society (Evrensel, 7 February 2016).  
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Among the signatories, Esra Mungan, Muzaffer Kaya, Kıvanç Ersoy, and Meral Camcı were 
called in for questioning and were arrested on 14 March 2016, two months after the petition 
press release. They were accused of “making terrorist propaganda” under the Counter-
Terrorism Law (Article 7/2) (Altıparmak and Akdeniz 2017, 15). The obvious reason behind 
their detention and arrest was that they publicly read the petition one more time even though it 
had been criminalized. At the time of the arrests, Camcı was abroad but she returned and joined 
her colleagues in jail in order to show solidarity. After these academics were arrested, President 
Erdoğan publicly endorsed an extension of the legal definition of a terrorist:  
It might be the terrorist who pulls the trigger and detonates the bomb, but it 
is these supporters and accomplices who allow that attack to achieve its goal. 
The fact their title is politician, academic, writer, journalist or head of a civil 
society group doesn’t change the fact that individual is a terrorist (Nature, 16 
March 2016).   
After five weeks of imprisonment and solitary confinement, the three scholars were brought 
before the court. The accusations included taking orders from the PKK leaders, legitimizing 
the PKK, accusing the Turkish state for committing massacres and preparing ground for 
inviting United Nations observers to the Turkish terriroty among others. Initially charged under 
counter terrorism laws, the prosecutor inexplicably changed tack and sought to frame the 
prosecution under the infamous Article 301 of Turkey’s legal code that prohibits ‘insulting 
Turkey and Turkisness’. The judge adjourned the case to 27 September and the trial was then 
delayed through to the end of December 2016 and then to March 2017, and then again to 18 
July 2017 in order for the prosecutors to obtain the necesarry permission from the Ministry of 
Justice to proceed with a prosecution under Article 301. 
Events have also shown that foreigners are as vulnerable as local Turks to prosecution. Chris 
Stephenson, a British computer scientist at Bilgi University who protested against the arrests 
of the four academics mentioned above, was himself detained in March 2016. He elected to 
leave Turkey while awaiting a deportation order. He was escorted to his plane in the presence 
of a police officer. He had been detained after police found leaflets publicizing Kurdish New 
Year celebrations on 21 March (Newroz) in his possession. This publicity material was also 
considered ‘terrorist propaganda’. He was then told he would be able to return to Turkey but 
would have in that case to face trial.ix  The well-planned strategy behind the arrest signalled to  
the foreign and domestic audiance alike that: 1) foreign nationals would not be exempted from 
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prosecution simply on account of their citizenship status; 2) anyone who publicly supports the 
Kurds or voices criticism of the Turkish state’s or government’s actions towards them is 
vulnerable to arrest and prosecution, and; 3) diplomatic tensions can be avoided when 
foreigners are implicated because Turkey is able to fall back on the ‘counter-terrorism’ 
justification. Therefore, showing dissent as a foreign national risks deportation, detention, 
harrassment or loss of employment, on top of the stigmatization dished out by the mainstream 
media. The signal to all Westerners living in Turkey was clear.  
The criminalization of academics through counter-terrorism discourse is the handiwork of five 
principal state institutions and actors: the president, the AKP government, mainstream media 
outlets (newspapers, TV channels), the judiciary and the police, and YÖK and the universities. 
Social media has also been deployed widely by pro-AKP trolls. The aim of this defamation 
campaign against academics is collective character assassination. By insulting an entire 
profession as ‘dissidents’, delegitimizing their demands, criminalizing intellectual dissent by 
cultivating a hostile anti-intellectual environment and stigmatizing anyone who would oppose 
government policies on the Kurdish issue the state seeks to bring academics to heel.x  
The whole debate on the petition also drew attention away from the plight of Kurdish civilians 
in the region, making the academics and their freedoms the issue. At times, therefore, the 
discussion about freedom of speech and academic autonomy overshadowed the original 
purpose of the petition, which was to stop state violence in the region. Similarly, the 
international solidarity campaigns cast light on the fundamental rights of academics leaving 
the Kurdish issue largely tangential to the main discussion. Many solidarity declarations asked 
the Turkish government to immediately stop persecuting academics yet failed to mention the 
human rights abuses going on against the Kurdish population in Turkey.  
The outcome of the debate showed the longstanding vulnerability and precarious existence of 
academics in Turkey. The absence of job security and the ease with which they can be 
dismissed from universities because of their political views has always been at issue. Moreover, 
the debate exposed in no uncertain terms the lack of capacity universities have to defend 
academic freedom generally and their staff’s freedom of speech in particular. Oppression of 
academics became more visible than ever before. Moreover, the ‘subcontracting’ of monitoring 
and surveillance of academic conduct to the public – including, tragically, students themselves 
– takes matters to a new level. Before the petition, there had been isolated cases of students 
reporting lecturers who criticized the government or taught on controversial issues. However, 
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under the new dispensation students who come forward are amply rewarded for demonstrating 
their allegiance to the AKP and President Erdogan. Sadly, student snitches and informants now 
join university rectors, heads of departments and other bureaucrats as enforcers of state policy 
against academic freedom. A June 2016 incident at Bilgi University in which a student recorded 
his professor criticizing President Erdogan and passed the recordings to the mainstream media 
stands as a case in point. Because of this duplicity, the professor was dismissed from the 
university (Diken, 18 June 2016). 
The course of events once more proves the hegemonic influence of President Erdogan in almost 
every field – the judiciary, security services, universities, media, and parliament. It is also clear 
that orthodox understandings of terrorism are still very strong in Turkey and that the peace 
process never really succeeded in breaking the Turkish reflex of seeing the Kurds as the ‘enemy 
within’. While the ease with which it is possible to gin up nationalist fervour through media 
maniupulation makes this an obvious strategy for the government, the entire process overlooks 
just how counter-productive these hyper-nationalist strategies have proven in the past, only 
serving to make the conflict more toxic and likely more protracted (Barrinha 2011:164). 
Indeed, given that the AKP launched the peace process precisely because it realized that the 
policies of the past would no longer work, the return to type speaks volumes about the 
government’s political desperation. 
The Failed Coup Attempt and the Academic Purge that Followed 
The 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey was undoubtedly one of the most significant events 
in the country’s recent history.  According to testimonies and popular news, a group of flag 
officers of Turkey’s army attempted an overthrow of Erdoğan and the AKP government 
(Adams 2016). AKP politicians and the mainstream media blame the Gülen Movement (GM)xi 
for plotting this coup attempt. However, the jury is still out on whether the putschists were 
drawn only from Gülenist cliques in the military or whether the revolt in the ranks was more 
widespread.  
Turkey, of course, has suffered long periods of military tutelage and a variety of different types 
of military intervention in politics. This particular coup attempt, however, was distinctive. Five 
days after the coup attempt, the AKP government declared a state of emergency for three 
months and President Erdoğan announced it to the public as a positive step and as an 
opportunity to clean up pro-Gülenist people from the public sector (Jones and Kandemir 2016). 
The state of emergency was later prolonged for another six months.  Although, on paper, the 
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state of emergency seems to be related to the putsch, it is fair to argue that President Erdoğan 
has been using his emergency powers to overhaul most of the opposition groups and potential 
social and political targets. The need to protect the Turkish nation and state in these exceptional 
circumstances gives a patina of legitimation to these moves. On the one hand, according to 
figures released by the Turkish media, the putsch involved 8,651 officers or 1.5 per cent of 
armed forces’ personnel (Pitel 2016). On the other hand, in the first two weeks of the state of 
emergency, multiple universities and hundreds of civil society associations, media centres and 
companies were shut down. Additionally, thousands of teachers in their probation period were 
let go, thousands of passports were annulled and hundreds of people – including journalists, 
scholars, judges, bureaucrats, and state officials – were suspended under investigation and/or 
arrested, including many Alevis, leftists, and Kemalists who did not have any relations with 
the Gülen movement. The government made these moves on the grounds that the accused had 
aided and abetted the coup attempt. Moreover, members of the HDP, including the party’s co-
leaders and elected mayors, which is considered to be a pro-minority left-wing party in Turkey, 
have been arrested and put in jail dashing hopes for a renewal of the peace process. These 
arrests showed very clearly that the purge was intended to go much beyond the Gülenist circles.  
Following the failed coup, more than more than a hundred thousand civil servants were 
expelled from public service, others were detained, and arrested. Several universities were 
closed down and thousands of academics have been dismissed (T24,2 December 2016). 
Expulsion from public service results in being banned from taking up office in public 
institutions or corporations, the confiscation of passports, and, if deemed necessary, the 
confiscation of property. Expulsion from a university deprives the academic of the right to 
submit an associate professorship application, which in Turkey can be obtained without 
institutional affiliation. In addition to those dismissed before the coup, more than 300 
signatories of the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition were expelled from public service through 
state of emergency decrees between September 2016 and February 2017.xii Others who are not 
suspended have to live under heavy pressures and mobbing at many universities all around 
Turkey. Some are constantly pressured to withdraw their signatures. As Altıparmak and 
Akdeniz (2017,71) accounts, there is no available information on what kind of methods has 
been used to prepare the emergency decrees to suspend these academics. Nobody has access to 
the information on proofs which criminalized these academics and others in order to be 
mentioned in these decrees. As the authors argue, the only reason why these academics have 
been dismissed was because they signed the petition. This situation surely against the European 
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Court of Human Rights’ Article 10 on the freedom of speech. The emergency decrees no only 
violate freedom of speech but also the right to fair trial and protection of privacy (Altıparmak 
and Akdeniz 2017, 73).  
As elected opposition politicians are arrested, academics are suspended and banned from public 
service, there is massive surveillence of social media accounts and the political climate in 
Turkey becomes all the more totalitarian. In the post-putsch period, the ‘undesirables’ of the 
newly emerging regime are being silenced in order for a ‘New Turkey’ – in which there is no 
room for concepts such as democracy, peace or freedom of speech – to be born.  
Concluding Remarks: Contesting Oppression and Creating Venues of Resistance as 
Academics 
The ‘Academics for Peace’ petition was published in an open letter format in January 2016, 
with the aim of making a call for peace and asking the Turkish state to return to the negotiating 
table with the Kurdish armed movement, the PKK. The initiative was a loose one with no 
hierarchical structure. The petition was distributed through social media and signed by 
academics who thought they could make a change despite the fact that it is very unlikely with 
a petition. The reaction from the president, state institutions, YÖK and the university rectors 
and heads of departments was not proportionate and it aimed at criminalizing the signatory 
academics for being critical of the state’s official policies. Counter-terrorism law has been used 
in conjunction with the politics of fear, in order to stigmatize this whole group as ‘terrorist 
sympathizers’, discourage others to show dissent and to instruct authorities to take measures 
against those who dare to speak out. The reactions to the petition also managed to scare away 
the ‘people in the middle’ who were neither in line with state’s actions in the southeast region 
of Turkey but who dared not sign a document saying as much. They are buried in silence. 
As mentioned above, after almost a year the prosecution of these signatory academics continues 
and there are still pending charges against them for ‘terrorist propaganda’ and ‘insulting 
Turkey’. Most of the signatories have not given up on their demands and have created various 
avenues of resistance in order to demonstrate that their cause was a just one. While the court 
cases are pending, universities also try to make their job harder by not allowing them to attend 
international conferences, sabbaticals or other visits. Some have lost their passports during the 
recent purge and are subject to travel bans. Some academics are also taken out of conference 
programs because they are signatories (Bianet, 7 April 2016). In the meantime, individual 
applications to institutions such as Scholars at Risk or the Scholar Rescue Fund skyrocketed.  
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Those who have been dismissed from their universities find it hard to find another job as other 
institutions hesitate to employ signatory academics. Their criminalisation continues by the 
main stream media and other state institutions. They are forced to live a “civil death” in Turkey 
by being deprived from their basic rights. The unfair treatment and mobbing also caused one 
academicxiii to commit suicide which was exemplary in terms of showing the psychological 
damage that this process is giving to the signatories. Some academics also started a hunger 
strike demanding the lifting of the state of emergency and returning to their academic posts 
among others.  
They are finding ‘solidarity academies’ where they teach for free or they find ‘people without 
campus’ initiatives in order to pursue their academic ideals by underlining that they don’t need 
an institution for intellectual activities. Some academics in Eskişehir even founded a musical 
band and sing songs for peace. Some prominent academics such as Baskın Oran, have opened 
court cases against President Erdoğan for slander (Qantara, 29 June 2016). It can be said that 
the ‘Academics for Peace’ initiative is a social movement in the making in Turkey.  
Surely, the oppression, lack of employment and sense of insecurity drive many academics to 
look for alternatives abroad. Especially after the putsch, there has been a brain drain of 
academics from Turkey. Countries such as France, Germany and Czechia have declared their 
support for the academics who are oppressed by the ruling regime. Not only persecuted 
academics, but also some who have never been openly critical, are leaving. Time will show 
whether this is temporary or permanent. To our dismay, many intellectuals are also 
surrendering their civic courage and intellectual capacities to the dictates of the regime which 
is becoming authoritarian. This is precisely the outcome Giroux (2016, 156) predicted for US 
academia under the impact of neo-liberalism.  As long as the culture of fear flourishes in 
Turkey, it seems as if the hope for improvements in academic freedom, freedom of speech and 
room for critique fades day by day. 
Disclaimer: Two of this article’s authors are signatories of the petition. However, in no way 
do the authors represent ‘Academics for Peace’ as a group and the authors wish to underline 
that this article solely reflects their personal assessments and viewpoints. None of the 
statements made or opinions expressed in the article can be attributed to the signatories, 
collectively or individually, of the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition.  
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crime.  
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writings on the Kurds. The imprisonment of Prof. Busra Ersanli in 2011 is also a case in point.  
iii “For example, when the the German Parliament passed the Armenian Genocide resolution 
anonymously on June 2, 2016, university presidents came under pressure to issue public 
statements supporting Turkish foreign policy” (Gocek 2016).   
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Akdeniz (2017, 101-139). 
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vi First author’s personal contact with Prof. Willie Esterhuyse and Prof. Willie Breytenbach, 
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ix YÖK has cancelled Dr. Stephenson’s work permit in March 2017. He worked in Turkey for 18 
years. In the time of writing this article, he is preparing for appeal. Other foreign academics who 
were working in Turkey and who were signatories to the petition have also lost their work permits. 
x It also bears noting that these types of smear campaign in Turkey frequently happen and in 
rare cases result in political murders. The cases of Hrant Dink, an Armenian journalist in 
Turkey, and Tahir Elci, a Kurdish lawyer and human rights activist, are examples of how far 
stigmatization can go. For more information on the case of Hrant Dink see Freely (2007) and 
for the case of Tahir Elci see Darici (2016).  
xi The Gülen Movement is a political-religious network organised under the ideas of Fethullah Gülen. Even though the 
Movement has been trying to show itself is an inter-religious and dialogue based civil society, it has two different 
faces that are indirectly connected each other. While the civil face is mostly based on philanthropy and cultural 
dialogue activates, the political face is aiming to reach power via controlling the bureaucratic mechanisms in Turkey 
that has reach the pick point during the AKP period.  
xii One should make a distinction between the academics who were suspended by the emergency decrees 
because of their alleged connections to the GM and the others who were the signatories of the decision. Also, 
some of the suspended academics had no connections to the movement but they were employees of higher 
education institutions which were allegedly linked to the GM. Although all groups are affected by the 
authoritarian tendencies in Turkey and they had to endure unfair detentions and suspensions, the main reason 
behind their dismissals are different. The signatories are targeted by the government and the president, and 
consequently by other state apparatuses due to their stance on human rights issues in Turkey. Their political 
stance on the Kurdish Question and how to tackle with the creeping authoritarianism in Turkey also clearly 
distinct from the GM and its supporters. The GM and its media apparatuses have also instrumentalized the 
counter-terrorism rhetoric until they broke up their alliance with the AKP government and their attitude has 
been systematically criticized by most of the signatories of the petition.  
xiii Mehmet Fatih Traş was a research assistant at Cukurova University. He committed suicide 
in February 2017 as a result of psychological trauma after being dismissed from his job.  
 
